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EIGHTH AMENDMENT-CAPITAL
SENTENCING INSTRUCTIONS
Johnson v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 2658 (1993)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Johnson v. Texas,' the United States Supreme Court held that
the Texas capital sentencing statute did not violate the Eighth
Amendment rights of petitioner Dorsie Lee Johnson, Jr.2 The
Court ruled that the trial court was not constitutionally required to
instruct the jury to consider mitigating aspects of Johnson's youth
independent of the statute's special issue framework. 3 According to
the Court, the jury was able to adequately consider all of the miti-
gating evidence proferred by Johnson, including evidence of his
youth, through an assessment of Johnson's future dangerousness. 4
This Note argues that the Court, by failing to recognize the im-
portance of Johnson's moral culpability as a factor in sentencing,
incorrectly held that the Texas capital sentencing statute was consti-
tutional as applied to Johnson. Consistent with Justice O'Connor's
dissenting opinion, this Note asserts that the Eighth Amendment re-
quires the level of punishment for a crime to be directly propor-
tional to a defendant's moral culpability. Because the Texas
sentencing statute precluded the jury from giving "independent
mitigating weight" to Johnson's youth, this Note argues that the
statute failed to meet the constitutional requirement of proportional
punishment. In addition, this Note argues that under the Eighth
Amendment, the jury must be able to consider fully all of a defend-
ant's proferred mitigating evidence as it relates to his moral
culpability.
II. BACKGROUND
The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution provides that
"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
1 113 S. Ct. 2658 (1993).
2 Id. at 2672.
S Id. at 2670; see infra note 21 and accompanying text for an explanation of the spe-
cial issue framework.
4 Johnson, 113 S. Ct. at 2670.
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nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." 5 The Court's first
significant interpretation of the Eighth Amendment's role in capital
sentencing procedure appeared in Furman v. Georgia.6 In Furman,
the Court held that a system which allowed unconstrained jury dis-
cretion at the sentencing phase of a capital trial violated the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punish-
ment."' 7 To protect against the risk of arbitrary and capricious
death penalty sentences, the Court concluded that the Eighth
Amendment requires states to channel the discretion of sentencing
juries through appropriate statutory schemes.8
In response to Furman, some states adopted mandatory statu-
tory sentencing schemes to reduce the risk of arbitrary and capri-
cious decision making. 9 Although mandatory sentencing produced
uniformity in the capital sentencing process, systems that prevented
the sentencer from considering the character of the defendant and
the nature of his crime remained unjust. In two 1976 cases, the
Court recognized that the "fundamental respect for humanity un-
derlying the Eighth Amendment" required sentencing statutes to
follow another principle that conflicted with the principle stated in
Furman. ' 0 The Court stated that "consideration of the character and
record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the par-
ticular offense [is] a constitutionally indispensable part of the pro-
cess of inflicting the penalty of death."' 1 Since the mandatory
sentencing statutes in question did not allow for the consideration
of mitigating evidence, the Court determined that both statutes con-
stituted "cruel and unusual punishment" within the scope of the
Eighth Amendment. 12
In 1978, the Supreme Court again confronted the conflict be-
tween the Eighth Amendment's requirement of uniformity in a capi-
5 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
6 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
7 Id. at 308-10 (Stewart, J., concurring). While no two Justices agreed on the exact
same rationale in Furman, the guiding principle of the Court's decision is best expressed
in Justice Stewart's concurring opinion. Johnson, 113 S. Ct. at 2664.
8 Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart,J., concurring).
9 The mandatory sentencing statutes listed all of the offenses that constituted first
degree murder and imposed an automatic death sentence on any defendant convicted of
one of the enumerated offenses. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975)
(amended 1977, 1979, 1981, 1987, 1989); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (West 1974)
(amended 1976, 1979, 1985, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1992).
10 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion); see also
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (plurality opinion).
11 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (controlling joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Ste-
vens, JJ.); see also Roberts, 428 U.S. at 333 (controlling joint opinion of Stewart, Powell,
and Stevens, JJ.).
12 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 335-36.
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tal sentencing scheme Snd the need for a sentencer to consider the
individual nature of a defendant and his crime. In Lockett v. Ohio, l3
the defendant claimed "that her death sentence [was] invalid be-
cause the statute under which it was imposed did not permit the
sentencing judge to consider, as mitigating factors, her character,
prior record, age, lack of specific intent to cause death, and her rela-
tively minor part in the crime."' 14 In response to Lockett's conten-
tion, the Court acknowledged that the cases following Furman had
not provided states with clear and adequate guidelines for con-
structing capital sentencing statutes.' 5 The Court refined the
Eighth Amendment's requirements in an attempt to eliminate the
apparent tension between the principle that states must channel jury
discretion and the notion that a sentencer must consider both the
particularized characteristics of the defendant and the particularized
nature of the crime. 16
Given the severity of the choice between life and death, the
Court concluded that "[t]he need for treating each defendant in a
capital case with that degree of respect due the uniqueness of the
individual is far more important than in noncapital cases."' 17 To en-
sure that a defendant is not denied this "degree of respect," the
Court placed a great deal of weight on the sentencer's ability to con-
sider the individualized nature of the defendant:
[W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require
that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be
precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a de-
fendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the of-
fense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death.18
'3 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
14 Id. at 597. The Ohio sentencing statute under attack required a two-tiered inquiry
similar, although not identical, to the Texas statute. First, the statute specified seven
aggravating circumstances of murder, at least one of which must be present in order for
an offense to fall within the scope of capital punishment. OHio REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2929.04(A) (Baldwin 1975) (amended 1981). Once a defendant was convicted of a
capital offense, the "Ohio death penalty statute required the trial judge to impose a
death sentence unless, after 'considering the nature and circumstances of the offense'
and [the] 'history, character, and condition' " of the offender, the sentencing judge de-
termined that the defendant had established at least one of three stated mitigating cir-
cumstances by a preponderance of the evidence. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 593-94 (quoting
OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (Baldwin 1975) (amended 1981)).
15 Id. at 602.
16 The Court established the first principle in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972), and the second principle in Woodson, 428 U.S. at 280.
17 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605.
18 Id. at 604. As part of this requirement, states now must allow the sentencer to give
"independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant's character and record and
to circumstances of the offense proffered in mitigation." Id. at 605.
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Since the sentencing statute created the risk that the death penalty
would be imposed despite mitigating factors that may have called
for a less severe sentence, the Ohio statute was incompatible with
the Eighth Amendment.' 9
Responding to the Supreme Court's evolving capital punish-
ment jurisprudence, Texas adopted a unique capital sentencing
scheme. The scheme contained two basic components. First, the
scheme limited the application of capital punishment to intentional
and knowing murders committed in six situations. 20 Second, the
statute instructed the sentencer to answer three special issues to de-
termine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death. 21 If
the sentencer answered the special issues in the affirmative, then the
19 Id at 605. In a series of cases, the Court has reaffirmed Lockett's interpretation of
the Eighth Amendment. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982) ('just
as the State may not by statute preclude the sentencer from considering any mitigating
factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant
mitigating evidence."); see also Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987) (trial judge
unconstitutionally instructed the jury not to consider evidence of the defendant's family
background and capacity for rehabilitation); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1
(1986) (trial court unconstitutionally prevented a defendant from presenting evidence to
the sentencer concerning the defendant's positive adjustment to prison life).
20 The six situations are as follows:
(1) the person murders a peace officer or fireman who is acting in the lawful dis-
charge of an official duty and who the person knows is a peace officer or
fireman;
(2) the person intentionally commits murder in the course of committing or at-
tempting to commit. kidnapping, burglary, robbery, aggravated sexual assault,
or arson;
(3) the person commits the murder for remuneration or the promise of remunera-
tion or employs another to commit the murder for remuneration or the promise
of remuneration;
(4) the person commits the murder while escaping or attempting to escape from a
penal institution;
(5) the person, while incarcerated in a penal institution, murders another who is
employed in the operation of the penal institution; or
(6) the person murders more than one person:
(A) during the same criminal transaction; or
(B) during different criminal transactions but the murders are committed pur-
suant to the same scheme or course of conduct.
TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994) (amended 1993).
21 The portion of the Texas sentencing statute that establishes the special issues in-
quiry states:
(b) On conclusion of the presentation of the evidence (at the sentencing phase of a
capital murder trial], the court shall submit the following issues to the jury:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased
was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the
death of the deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing
the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by
the deceased.
TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071 (West 1981).
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court had no choice but to impose the death penalty.22
The Supreme Court first considered the constitutionality of this
Texas capital sentencing statute inJurek v. Texas.23 Injurek, the de-
fendant was convicted for the murder of a ten-year-old girl commit-
ted during the course of a kidnapping and attempted rape.24 Since
the offense was one of the specified capital crimes listed in Texas'
sentencing statute, the trial court instructed the jury to determine
the defendant's punishment based solely on the answers to the two
relevant special issues. 25 A unanimous jury answered both ques-
tions in the affirmative and, accordingly, the judge sentenced the
defendant to death.26
The defendant appealed all the way to the Supreme Court, ar-
guing that the post-Furman changes in Texas' sentencing statute
were "no more than cosmetic in nature and ha[d] in fact not elimi-
nated the arbitrariness and caprice of the system held in Furman to
violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." 27 Analyzing the
statute in light of the competing principles expressed in Furman and
the mandatory sentencing cases, 28 the Court reasoned that the
"constitutionality of the Texas procedures turns on whether the
enumerated questions [special issues] allow consideration of partic-
ularized mitigating factors."' 29 The Court examined the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals' interpretation of the second special is-
sue to resolve this essential question. 30 The Texas Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals had "indicated that it will interpret the second question
so as to allow a defendant to bring to the jury's attention whatever
mitigating circumstances he may be able to show."31 Based on this
22 The relevant portion of the Texas sentencing statute stated:
(e) If thejury returns an affirmative finding on each issue submitted under this arti-
cle, the court shall sentence the defendant to death.
TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071 (West 1981) (amended 1981, 1991).
23 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
24 Id. at 264-67.
25 Based on the facts of the case, the trial court concluded that the third special issue
was not relevant to the sentencing decision. Id. at 267.
26 Id. at 268.
27 Id. at 274.
28 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S.
325 (1976).
2 9 Jurek, 428 U.S. at 272.
30 Id.
31 Id. ForJurek's particular sentencing process, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
stated:
In determining the likelihood that the defendant would be a continuing threat to
society, the jury could consider whether the defendant had a significant criminal
record.... It could further look to the age of the defendant and whether or not at
the time of the commission of the offense he was acting under duress or under the
domination of another. ...
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broad interpretation of the second issue, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that "the Texas capital-sentencing procedure guides and fo-
cuses the jury's objective consideration of the particularized
circumstances of the individual offense and the individual offender
before it can impose a sentence of death." 32 As a result, the Texas
sentencing statute did not violate the requirements of the Eighth
Amendment.
33
AlthoughJurek resolved the question of the facial constitution-
ality of Texas' capital sentencing statute, the principles expressed in
Lockett v. Ohio3 4 two years later prompted several new challenges to
the Texas death penalty system.3 5 The new challenges did not con-
test the general constitutionality of the Texas statute; rather, they
focused on a sentencer's ability to fully consider particular types of
mitigating evidence under the special issues format.
In Franklin v. Lynaugh,36 a convicted defendant claimed that the
special issue instructions required by the Texas statute "did not al-
low the jury to give adequate weight to the mitigating evidence of
[his] good behavior while in prison."' 37 The defendant argued that
the mitigating evidence he presented to the jury had significance, as
a reflection on his character, independent of its relevance to the spe-
cial issues.38 Rejecting the defendant's assertion, the Court con-
cluded that "the jury was surely free to weigh and evaluate
petitioner's disciplinary record as it bore on his 'character' . . . as
measured by his likely future behavior. '3 9 Since the jury was able to
Jurek v. State, 522 S.W.2d 934, 939-40 (Tex. Grim. App. 1975).
32 Jurek, 428 U.S. at 273-74.
33 Id at 276.
34 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
35 The Lockett Court distinguished its decision injurek by noting that the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals had broadly interpreted the second special issue in the Texas sen-
tencing statute. Id at 607. Unlike the Ohio statute, which limited the number of miti-
gating factors the sentencer could consider, the broad scope of Texas' second special
issue did not "prevent the sentencer [in Jurek] from considering any aspect of the de-
fendant's character and record or any circumstances of his offense as an independently
mitigating factor." Id. Thus, although the structure of the Ohio and Texas capital sen-
tencing statutes was similar, the Court's refined Eighth Amendment interpretation in
Lockett did not affect the facial constitutionality of the Texas statute.
36 487 U.S. 164 (1988).
37 Id at 172. At trial, the defendant submitted five special jury instructions request-
ing the jury to consider all the defendant's proffered mitigating evidence when answer-
ing the special issues. The instructions essentially stated that mitigating evidence
"could alone be enough to return a negative answer to... [the issues]-even if the jury
otherwise believed that 'Yes' answers to the [s]pecial [i]ssues were warranted." Id. at
169. The trial judge refused to deliver any of the defendant's requested jury instruc-
tions. Id at 169-70.
38 Id at 177.
39 Id. at 178.
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weigh the mitigating evidence in relation to the second special issue,
there was no constitutional requirement that the jury should have
been able "to cast an 'independent' vote against the death penalty"
apart from its answers to the special issues.40
By reaffirming the constitutionality of Texas' death penalty stat-
ute, the Court indicated that Lockett's emphasis on mitigating evi-
dence did not suggest thatJurek should be overruled or modified.
The Court stated that "we have never suggested thatjury considera-
tion of mitigating evidence must be undirected or unfocused; we
have never concluded that States cannot channel jury discretion in
capital sentencing in an effort to achieve a more rational and equita-
ble administration of the death penalty. '41 Because the Texas spe-
cial issue format channeled jury discretion in a way that did not
preclude the jury from considering relevant mitigating evidence, the
Court was not inclined to overruleJurek.
42
In her concurring opinion in Franklin, however, Justice
O'Connor expressed some doubts about the constraints that the
Texas system imposed on a jury's consideration of mitigating evi-
dence. InJustice O'Connor's view, the punishment in a capital case
"should be directly related to the personal culpability of the crimi-
nal defendant. '43 As long as the mitigating evidence introduced by
a defendant is only relevant to the special issues, the jury should be
able to decide the appropriate punishment.44 However, to the ex-
tent the mitigating evidence "had relevance to the defendant's
moral culpability beyond the scope of the special verdict questions,
the jury instructions would have provided the jury with no vehicle
for expressing its 'reasoned moral response' to that evidence." 45
Although Justice O'Connor concluded that the facts of Franklin did
not present such a situation, her opinion paved the way for future
attacks on the Texas special issues based on a sentencer's inability
to consider the effect of mitigating evidence on moral culpability.
A year later, in Penry v. Lynaugh,46 a defendant claimed that the
Texas death penalty statute did not allow the jury to consider and
give mitigating effect to evidence of his mental retardation. Deliver-
ing the opinion of the Court, Justice O'Connor stated that the Texas
statute violated the defendant's Eighth Amendment rights because
40 Id. at 179.
41 Id. at 181.
42 Id. at 180.
43 Id. at 184.
44 Id. at 185.
45 Id.
46 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
860 [Vol. 84
CAPITAL SENTENCING
it did not allow the jury to express a "reasoned moral response" to
the evidence of mental retardation in rendering its sentencing
decision.
47
In respect to the statute's first special issue,48 Justice O'Connor
concluded that, while the jury was able to consider the evidence in
determining whether the defendant had acted "deliberately," it was
unable to considerfully the evidence because the defendant's mental
retardation "had relevance to [his] moral culpability beyond the
scope of the special verdict question."' 49 Clearly, a rational juror
could have determined that the defendant had acted deliberately,
while at the same time recognizing that he was less morally culpable
than defendants who were not mentally retarded.50
Like the first special issue, the special issue regarding "future
dangerousness" did not allow the jury to consider fully the mitigat-
ing effect of the defendant's mental retardation. 51 Justice O'Connor
described the evidence the defendant introduced at trial as a "two-
edged sword."' 52 While the defendant's mental retardation substan-
tially impaired his ability to learn from past mistakes, it also reduced
his moral culpability for the crime committed. 53 Within the confines
of the special issues, the jury had no choice but to consider the de-
fendant's mental retardation solely as an aggravating factor in its
"future dangerousness" inquiry.54 As a result, the jury was not able
to reduce the sentence in accordance with the defendant's dimin-
ished moral blameworthiness. 55
While the Court stopped short of overrulingJurek, Penry repre-
sented a break from prior cases upholding the constitutionality of
the Texas capital sentencing statute. Justice O'Connor's doubts
about the Texas system, first expressed in Franklin, were a driving
force behind the Court's re-evaluation of the special issue jury in-
struction format.
Recently, in Graham v. Collins,56 the Court encountered another
Eighth Amendment challenge to the Texas special issue jury in-
structions. Relying on Penry, the defendant argued that the jury was
not able to give full effect to mitigating evidence of his youth, family
47 Id. at 328.
48 See supra note 21.
49 Penry, 492 U.S. at 322.
50 Id. at 322-23.
51 Id. at 324.
52 Id.
53 Id at 323-24.
54 Id. at 323.
55 Id at 327-28.
56 113 S. Ct. 892 (1993).
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background, and positive character traits.57 The Court ruled, how-
ever, that Penry could not be extended to the facts in Graham.5" Un-
like the aggravating nature of the mental retardation evidence in
Penry, the evidence of Graham's youth "had mitigating relevance to
the second special issue concerning his likely future
dangerousness."
59
Although the Court applied the analysis in Penry to Graham's
claim, the Court based its holding against Graham on other
grounds.60 Because Graham brought the case before the Court on
collateral review, the Court had to determine initially whether grant-
ing Graham relief would create a new rule of constitutional law
under Teague v. Lane.6 1 To resolve this threshold issue, the Court
implemented a standard that required it to rule against Graham
"unless reasonable jurists hearing petitioner's claim at the time his
conviction became final 'would have felt compelled by existing pre-
cedent' to rule in [his] favor."6 2 Since "reasonable jurists may
[have] disagree[d]" about whether precedent dictated Graham's re-
quested relief, the Court concluded that Graham was asking for a
new constitutional rule.63 By dismissing Graham's claim under
Teague, the Court did not deal directly with whether "Penty reason-
ably could be read to suggest that Graham's mitigating evidence was
not adequately considered under the former Texas procedures." 64
Recognizing the inadequacies of the Texas capital sentencing
statute, as pointed out in Penry, the Texas legislature amended the
statute in 1991.65 The amendment explicitly required courts to in-
struct the sentencing jury to consider all of a defendant's mitigating
evidence, not only as it relates to the special issues, but also as it
pertains to the defendant's moral culpability. 66 Although the
57 Id. at 895.
58 Id. at 902.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 902-03.
61 489 U.S. 288 (1989). In Teague, the Court established that new constitutional rules
will not be aplied retroactively to invalidate final state convictions on federal habeas
review. Id. at 310. When hearing disputes on collateral review, all courts must first
resolve the threshold issue of whether the court's holding would constitute a new rule
under Teague. Id. at 301.
62 Graham, 113 S. Ct. at 898 (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990)).
63 Id. at 902.
64 Id. at 902-03.
65 TEX. GRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071(2)(e) (West Supp. 1994).
66 The amended version of the statute adds the following provision:
The court shall instruct the jury that if the jury returns an affirmative finding to each
issue submitted under Subsection (b) of this article [special issues], it shall answer
the following issue:
Whether, taking into consideration all of the evidence, including the circum-
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amendment provides a more appropriate punishment procedure for
defendants convicted of offenses committed on or after September
1, 1991, individuals who committed offenses prior to that date, such
as Dorsie LeeJohnson, Jr., must continue to challenge the constitu-
tionality of the former statute.6
7
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Late in the evening on March 23, 1986, petitioner Dorsie Lee
Johnson, Jr., and a female companion developed a plan to commit
an armed robbery of a convenience store in Snyder, Texas. 68 As
part of their plan, Johnson, age nineteen, and his companion agreed
that there should be no witnesses to the proposed robbery. 69 After
an initial surveillance of the store, Johnson, carrying a handgun in
his pocket, entered the store with his companion to execute the
robbery.
70
Shortly after entering the convenience store, Johnson in-
structed the only clerk on duty to lie down on the floor while his
companion emptied the cash register of about $160.00.71 Although
the clerk passively complied with Johnson's order, Johnson fired a
fatal bullet directly into the back of the clerk's neck. Having elimi-
nated the only witness to the robbery, Johnson and his companion
rushed out of the store and left the crime scene undetected.
7 2
A few weeks later, Johnson attempted a similar armed robbery
in Colorado City, Texas.7 3 This attempt proved unsuccessful, and
Johnson was arrested for the robbery and attempted murder of the
Colorado City store clerk. Following his arrest, Johnson voluntarily
confessed to the murder and robbery in Snyder.74 As a result of
Johnson's confession, a Texas trial court convicted him of capital
murder.7
5
Consistent with Texas law, an independent sentencing hearing
stances of the offense, the defendant's character and background, and the per-
sonal moral culpability of the defendant, there is a sufficient mitigating
circumstance or circumstances to warrant that a sentence of life imprisonment
rather than a death sentence be imposed.
TEX. GRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071(2)(e) (West Supp. 1994).
67 TEx. GRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071(2)(e) (West Supp. 1994) (effective Sept. 1,
1991).










followed Johnson's conviction. 76 At the beginning of the sentencing
stage, the court instructed the jury to answer two special issues as
stated in the Texas capital sentencing statute.77 The court told the
jury that the answers to these special issues would determine
whether Johnson would be put to death for his crimes. 78 For the
first issue, the jury had to decide whether "the conduct of the
[d]efendant... that caused the death of the deceased was commit-
ted deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death
of the deceased or another would result." 79 Following this determi-
nation, the jury had to determine whether there was a "probability
that the [d]efendant... would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing threat to society."80 In determining
both of these special issues, the court instructed the jury to consider
"all the evidence submitted ...in the trial of this case, whether
aggravating or mitigating in nature."'' s
While the prosecution presented numerous witnesses in an at-
tempt to convince the jury to answer the special issues in the affirm-
ative,8 2 Johnson's attorney presented only one witness-Johnson's
father.8 3 Johnson's father explained to the jury that his son's crimi-
nal activities were primarily the result of drug use and youth.8 4 In
regard to the effects of youth, he stated:
[A]ll I can say is I still think that a kid eighteen or nineteen years old
has an undeveloped mind, undeveloped sense of assembling not-I
don't say what is right or wrong, but the evaluation of it, how much,
you know, that might be-well, he just don't-he just don't evaluate
what is worth-what's worth and what's isn't like he should like a thirty
or thirty-five year old man would. He would take under consideration
a lot of things that a younger person that age wouldn't.
8 5
76 Id. at 2662.
77 Id. While there are three special issues under the former Texas statute, the third
special issue was not relevant to Johnson's case because his criminal acts were unpro-
voked. See supra note 21.
78 Johnson, 113 S. Ct. at 2662.
79 Id. (citing TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071(b)(1) (West 1981)).
80 Id. (citing § 37.071(b)(2)).
81 Id.
82 The State used the testimony of the witnesses to establish Johnson's violent ten-
dencies. One witness testified thatJohnson had shot the Colorado City store clerk in the
face, causing permanent brain damage and disfigurement. Id. Another witness stated
that Johnson had fired two bullets at a man in Snyder, Texas, six days after murdering
the Snyder store clerk. Id. In addition to the testimony concerning Johnson's teen-age
actions, the State also called witnesses to testify about Johnson's deviant behavior dur-
ing his younger years. For example, one witness testified thatJohnson had cut him with
a piece of glass while in seventh grade. Id.
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After considering all of the evidence, a unanimous jury re-
turned affirmative answers to both special issues.86 Based on the
jury's findings, the court sentenced Johnson to death by lethal
injection.8
7
Rejecting all seven ofJohnson's alleged errors, 88 none of which
involved a challenge to the court's sentencing instructions, the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Johnson's conviction and
death sentence.8 9 Five days later, the Supreme Court decided Penry
v. Lynaugh.90 In response to Penry, Johnson filed a motion for re-
hearing in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, alleging that the
special issues required by the Texas capital sentencing statute vio-
lated his Eighth Amendment rights because they did not allow for
sufficient consideration of the mitigating factor of youth. 91 Once
again, the court rejected Johnson's argument, finding that "the jury
was able to express a reasoned moral response to [Johnson's] miti-
gating evidence within the scope of the . . .instructions given to
them by the trial court."92
Johnson continued to challenge the constitutionality of his
death sentence by filing a petition for certiorari with the United
States Supreme Court.93 The Court granted Johnson's petition94 to
decide the question of whether the Texas special issues allowed the
jury to adequately consider the mitigating effect of Johnson's
youth.9 5
86 Id. at 2664.
87 Respondent's Brief at 3,Johnson (No. 92-5653).
88 Five of the alleged errors involved the trial court's rulings on challenges for cause
of venirepersons made by Johnson and the State. As a sixth error, Johnson alleged that
the trial court sua sponte excused a veniremember over his objections and without a
challenge for cause by either party. For the seventh error, Johnson claimed that the trial
court erred in failing to grant his motion for a change of venue. Johnson v. Texas, 773
S.W.2d 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).89 Johnson, 113 S. Ct. at 2664.
90 492 U.S. 302 (1989). See supra notes 46-55 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Penry.
91 Johnson, 113 S. Ct. at 2664.
92 Id. Johnson argued that the trial judge should have given an instruction to the jury
explicitly allowing thejury to consider his age as a mitigating factor. Id. AlthoughJohn-
son had neither requested such an instruction at trial nor argued the issue prior to the
rehearing stage on appeal, his claim was not procedurally barred. Id. Thus, the court
decided Johnson's claim on its merits.
93 Id.
94 Johnson v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 1148 (1993).
95Johnson, 113 S. Ct. at 2661.
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
IV. THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for the majority,96 Justice Kennedy concluded that the
Texas special issue format did not violate the Eighth Amendment
rights of Dorsie Lee Johnson, Jr.97 Justice Kennedy found no sup-
port in Furman and its progeny for Johnson's contention that the
sentencing statute unconstitutionally limited the jury's considera-
tion of the mitigating evidence of his youth. Thus, according to jus-
tice Kennedy, the trial court was not constitutionally required to
give a separate jury instruction that would have allowed the jury to
consider Johnson's age as a mitigating factor independent of the
special issues.
98
To assess whether the Texas capital sentencing jury instruc-
tions satisfied the requirements of the Eighth Amendment, the ma-
jority considered "whether there [was] a reasonable likelihood that
the jury [had] applied the challenged instruction in a way that pre-
vent[ed] the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence." 99
Justice Kennedy recognized thatJohnson's youth was a relevant mit-
igating circumstance that must be within the effective reach of a cap-
ital sentencing jury.100 He believed, however, that "there [was] no
reasonable likelihood that the jury would have found itself fore-
closed from considering the relevant aspects of [Johnson's]
youth."101 Because the relevance of youth as a mitigating factor
stems from youth's transient nature, the jury was able adequately to
take youth into account as a mitigating factor through its assessment
of Johnson's future dangerousness. 10
2
Contrary to Johnson's assertion, the majority did not believe
that Penry v. Lynaugh 10 3 demanded a reversal ofJohnson's death sen-
tence. 10 4 The majority distinguished Penry from Johnson's situation
96 ChiefJustice Rehnquist andJustices White, Scalia, and Thomas joined in the opin-
ion of Justice Kennedy. Id.
97 Id. at 2672.
98 Id. at 2671-72.
99 Id. at 2669 (quoting Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990)). The majority
applied the standard that the Court established in Boyde to determine whether the jury
instructions precluded the jury "from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a
defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the
defendant- proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586, 604 (1978).
lOO Johnson, 113 S. Ct. at 2668.
101 Id. at 2669.
102 Id.
103 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
104 Johnson, 113 S. Ct. at 2669-70.
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based on the nature of the mitigating evidence presented in each
case.' 0 5 In Penry, the jury was only able to consider the defendant's
evidence of mental retardation as an aggravating factor with respect
to the second special issue.10 6 Unlike the inability to learn from pre-
vious mistakes associated with Penry's mental retardation, which can
only make future dangerous acts seem more likely, the transient na-
ture of Johnson's youth could be assessed as a mitigating factor
when the jury determined the probability of Johnson's future dan-
gerousness.10 7 The majority cited Graham v. Collins 108 as precedent
for this distinction.' 0 9 While the majority acknowledged that Gra-
ham was a federal habeas corpus proceeding decided on the thresh-
old Teague issue, it stated that the reasoning of Graham applied to
Johnson's case on direct review.110
Justice Kennedy thus disagreed with Johnson's contention that
"the forward-looking perspective of the future dangerousness in-
quiry did not allow the jury to take account of how petitioner's
youth bore upon his personal culpability for the murder he commit-
ted."'  If jurors believed that the transient quality of Johnson's
youth reduced his culpability for murder, there was no reasonable
likelihood that those same jurors would have felt precluded from
considering Johnson's diminished culpability for the crime in evalu-
ating his future dangerousness."
2
In summary, Justice Kennedy stated that Jurek v. Texas 113 and
Franklin v. Lynaugh" 114 had already shown that the Texas capital sen-
tencing statute satisfied the two competing principles required by
the Eighth Amendment. 51 If the Court accepted Johnson's argu-
ment, a trial court would have to instruct the jury to consider miti-
105 ldT
106 Id.
107 Id at 2670. When an individual commits a crime at a young age, the jury can
consider whether the reduced mental and emotional maturity frequently associated with
youth influenced the individual's criminal behavior. Id at 2669. If the jury decides that
the characteristics of youth were a significant factor in the individual's behavior, then the
jury may also determine that there is a low probability that the individual will be danger-
ous in the future because the characteristics associated with youth will diminish as the
individual grows into adulthood. Id.
108 1135 S. Ct. 892 (1993).
lO9 Johnson, 113 S. Ct. at 2668 ("Graham's case differed from Penry in that 'Graham's
evidence [of youth]-unlike Penry's-had mitigating relevance to the second special is-
sue concerning his likely future dangerousness.' ") (quoting Graham, 113 S. Ct. at 902).
110 Id at 2661.
I I Id at 2670.
112 Id.
113 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
114 487 U.S. 164 (1988).
115 Johnson, 113 S. Ct. at 2671-72.
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gating evidence independently of the special issues in almost every
capital case.' 16 According to Justice Kennedy, this clearly would vi-
olate the principle followed in Jurek and Franklin that a state must
have the power "to structure the consideration of mitigating evi-
dence."11 7 In addition to overrulingJurek and Franklin, a decision in
favor of Johnson would impermissibly alter the reasoning in Lock-
ett.118 Requiring a jury "to give effect to mitigating evidence in
every conceivable manner in which the evidence might be relevant"
contradicts the Lockett principle that the mitigating evidence ofJohn-
son's youth must simply be within the effective reach of the sen-
tencer. 119 Since the majority was not willing to depart from
precedent, the Texas special issues format remained a constitutional
capital sentencing procedure. 120
B. JUSTICE SCALIA'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Scalia agreed with the majority that the Constitution
permits Texas to channel jury discretion through the special issue
instructions. 12 1 However, Justice Scalia felt compelled to indicate
that there was a blatant inconsistency in the Court's capital sentenc-
ing jurisprudence. According to Justice Scalia, the principle stated
in Lockett "that the sentencer must be allowed to consider 'all rele-
vant mitigating evidence'" is incompatible with Furman's mandate
that the sentencer's discretion be channeled. 122 Justice Scalia stated
that this inconsistency "will continue to be true unless and until the
sort of 'channelling' of mitigating discretion that Texas has engaged
in here is not merely permitted (as the Court today holds), but posi-
tively required."'123 Unwilling to support such a further elaboration
of the Court's intricate Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, Justice
Scalia concluded by stating that the majority's decision was a proper
clarification of Franklin and Boyd.124
C. JUSTICE THOMAS' CONCURRENCE
Justice Thomas wrote a one-paragraph concurrence listing
three reasons why he feltJohnson could not base a successful argu-
116 Id. at 2671.
117 Id. at 2672.
118 Id. at 2671.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 2672.
121 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
122 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
123 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
124 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
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ment on Penry v. Lynaugh.125 First, Justice Thomas opined that the
decision in Penry was wrongly decided. 126 WhileJustice Thomas did
not present his reasoning for this conclusion, he did cite his concur-
ring opinion in Graham v. Collins1 27 as support for the proposi-
tion.1 28 Second, he stated his belief that later opinions have
narrowed the scope of Penry.129 Finally, he felt that the facts of Penry
were readily distinguishable from Johnson's case, although he did
not explain the distinction.'
30
D. THE DISSENTING OPINION
Writing for the dissent,131 Justice O'Connor concluded that the
Texas jury instructions did not adequately protect Johnson's consti-
tutional rights.' 3 2 Justice O'Connor stressed the critical relation-
ship between Johnson's youth and his moral culpability for the
crime he committed. 133 Although Justice O'Connor recognized that
the jury was able to give some consideration and effect to Johnson's
youth in the assessment of the "future dangerousness" special issue,
she felt the jury had no choice but to impose the death sentence on
Johnson without regard to any mitigating effect that Johnson's
youth had on his moral culpability.
13 4
Interpreting Penry, Justice O'Connor stated that the Constitu-
tion requires that the sentencer in a capital case "be able to givefull
effect to all mitigating evidence concerning the defendant's charac-
ter and record and the circumstances of the crime."13 5 According to
Justice O'Connor, two factors indicate that the jury was unable to
give full effect to Johnson's youth.' 3 6 First, the prosecution intro-
125 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)).
126 Id
127 113 S. Ct. 892, 903 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring).
128 Johnson, 113 S. Ct. at 2672 (Thomas, J., concurring).
129 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Graham, 113 S. Ct. at 913-14).
130 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
131 Justice O'Connor authored the dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Blackmun,
Stevens, and Souter. Id. at 2672.
132 Id. at 2680 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
133 Id. at 2673 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
134 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
135 Id. at 2675 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Unlike the majority in Johnson, Justice
O'Connor's interpretation of Penry did not focus on the finding that Penry's evidence
was only relevant to the second special issue as an aggravating factor.Johnson, 113 S. Ct.
at 2679. According to Justice O'Connor, the Court in Penry did not determine that the
second special issue was inadequate "because the evidence worked only against Penry."
Id Rather, the Court decided that the second special issue "was [constitutionally] inade-
quate because it did not allow thejury to give full effect to Penry's mitigating evidence."
Id.
136 Id at 2673 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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duced sufficient evidence at trial to establish that Johnson's violent
behavior was becoming more severe as Johnson grew older.' 37
Given this evidence, along with the fact that the dangerousness as-
sociated with Johnson's youth would not dissipate until sometime in
the future, there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury only con-
sidered Johnson's youth as an aggravating factor.' 38 If this oc-
curred, the jury would unconstitutionally have failed to give effect to
the mitigating nature of Johnson's youth. 139 Second, even if the
jury gave some mitigating effect to Johnson's youth while assessing
the second issue, the special issues framework still prevented the
jury from considering the most relevant mitigating aspect of John-
son's youth-moral culpability. 140 Without giving mitigating effect
to the relationship between Johnson's youth and his moral culpabil-
ity for the murder he committed, the jury was unable to express a
"reasoned moral response" in sentencing Johnson to death. 41
Unlike the majority, Justice O'Connor did not feel that the
holding of Jurek v. Texas 142 compelled the Court to rule against
Johnson. 143 Based on the conclusion of five concurring and dissent-
ing Justices in Franklin v. Lynaugh, 14 4 Justice O'Connor stated that
the facial review injurek did not suggest that the Texas sentencing
statute is constitutional in all circumstances.' 45 The defendant's
success in Penry indicated that the special issues scheme is open to
individual "as applied" constitutional attacks.' 46 Therefore, the
Court should have evaluated Johnson's "as applied" constitutional
challenge without regard to the holding inJurek.147
In addition, Justice O'Connor concluded that Graham v. Col-
lins 148 was not controlling. 149 In Graham, the decisive issue had not
137 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
138 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
139 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
140 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
141 Id. at 2674 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
142 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
143 Johnson, 113 S. Ct. at 2677-78 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
144 487 U.S. 164 (1988).
145 Johnson, 113 S. Ct. at 2678 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). According to Justice
O'Connor, the Johnson majority improperly relied on the minority view of this issue in
Franklin. In discussing the majority's interpretation of Franklin,Justice O'Connor stated:
[The majority] goes so far as to note with approval the minority position that "Jurek
foreclosed the defendant's argument that the jury was still entitled to cast an 'in-
dependent' vote against the death penalty even if it answered yes to the special
issues." This reading of Franklin turns stare decisis on its head.
Id (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Franklin, 487 U.S. at 180).
146 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
147 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
148 113 S. Ct. 892 (1993).
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been whether the constitution required an additional instruction to
allow the jury to give full effect to Graham's youth; rather, Graham
had focused on the nature of the Court's collateral review. 50 Fol-
lowing the applicable standands for collateral review, the Court ini-
tially had to determine whether Graham's contention required a
new constitutional rule.151 Because Johnson brought his argument
before the Court on direct review, the Court was not similarly con-
strained by this threshold issue.' 52 As a result, the Court had a
"constitutionally imposed duty to resolve [Johnson's contention] ...
'in light of [the Court's] best understanding of governing constitu-
tional principles.' "153 Applying this reasoning, Justice O'Connor
concluded that the Court should have vacated Johnson's sentence
and remanded the case for resentencing.' 54
V. ANALYSIS
The qualitative difference between capital punishment and
other noncapital sentences creates a greater "need for reliability in
the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a spe-
cific case."' 55 By upholding the constitutionality of the Texas capi-
tal sentencing statute in Johnson v. Texas, the Supreme Court
sanctioned an intolerable degree of uncertainty in the sentencing
procedure. Constrained by the limitations of the special issues
framework, the Texas jury was unable to give full effect to the miti-
gating force of Dorsie LeeJohnson's youth as it related to his moral
culpability for the crime committed. The jury's inability to focus on
Johnson's moral culpability created an unnecessary risk that John-
son would be undeserving of the punishment he received. Recog-
nizing this inherent deficiency in Texas former capital sentencing
system, this Note argues that the Texas statute violated the Eighth
Amendment by limiting the jury's consideration of Johnson's youth
through the special issues format.
A. MORAL CULPABILITY MUST BE AT THE CENTER OF THE CAPITAL
SENTENCING PROCESS
To analyze whether the Texas capital sentencing statute was
149 Johnson, 113 S. Ct. at 2674 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
150 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
151 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
152 Id (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
153 Id. (O'Connor,J., dissenting) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 679
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
154 Id at 2680 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
155 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
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consistent with the requirements of the Eighth Amendment, it is
necessary to determine what modem society considers to be the
most important factors in the capital sentencing process. For many
decades, the Supreme Court has followed the principle that the
scope of the Eighth Amendment's protection against "cruel and un-
usual punishment" must adapt to the "evolving standards of de-
cency that mark the progress of a maturing society."' 56  By
examining state capital sentencing legislation, as well as previous
Court opinions, it is possible to discover the current "standards of
decency" in society and, thus, better understand the scope of the
Eighth Amendment's protection. 157
In thirty of the thirty-six states that provide for the death
penalty, the legislature has adopted a sentencing statute that
enumerates certain mitigating circumstances which the sentencer
must consider in making its determination.15 8 While the states vary
greatly on the type of mitigating circumstances deemed important,
each of the thirty state statutes requires the sentencer to consider
the moral culpability of the defendant.' 59 Of these thirty states,
four states simultaneously list the probability of future dangerous-
ness and the defendant's moral culpability as mitigating
circumstances. 1
6 0
One of the aforementioned thirty states, Oregon, has more di-
rectly recognized the important role that moral culpability plays in
156 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
157 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
815, 865 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 220-26 (1976)
(White, J., concurring).
158 Six states have chosen not to list any mitigating factors in their sentencing statutes.
These states are Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Texas. Bev-
erly Lowry, Let God Sort Them Out? Refining the Individualization Requirement in Capital Sen-
tencing, 102 YALE L.J. 835, 851 n.66 (1992).
159 In almost all thirty states, the statute directly asks the sentencer to examine
"whether the defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct
or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of the law was impaired." Id. at
848. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51(6) (1982); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.G.1
(Supp. 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-103(4)(b) (West Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 53a-46a(g)(2) (1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921-141(6)(f) (West 1985)); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 565.032.3(6) (Vernon Supp. 1993); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-304(4) (1993);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5.VI(a) (Supp. 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(6)
(1991); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-102(j)(vi) (Supp. 1993).
160 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-103(4)(b) & (k) (West Supp. 1993); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 413(g)(4 ) & (7) (1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-6.C & G (Michie
1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.070(6) & (8) (West 1990). Unlike Texas, these
states do not list "future dangerousness" in a tripartite special issue format in which the
sentencer must give a direct answer to the question of future dangerousness. Rather,
the four state statutes include future dangerousness among a multitude of mitigating
factors that the jury must consider in making the final sentencing determination.
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the capital sentencing determination by channeling the sentencer's
consideration of enumerated mitigating circumstances within a spe-
cial issues framework. 161 While Oregon's statute instructs the sen-
tencer to answer the same three special issues as the Texas statute,
the Oregon statute adds a fourth question that requires the sen-
tencer to consider directly "whether the defendant should receive a
death sentence." 162 This "catch all" provision allows the jury to re-
fuse to impose the death penalty for any reason, including a lack of
moral culpability on the part of the defendant. Much like the
enumeration of moral culpability as a mitigating circumstance in the
aforementioned thirty states, this fourth question indicates that soci-
ety's "evolving standards of decency" demand a strong considera-
tion of a defendant's moral culpability.
Even the Texas legislature has recognized that society places a
great deal of emphasis on the relationship between punishment and
a defendant's moral culpability. 163 By adding a fourth question sim-
ilar to that in the Oregon statute to the Texas sentencing statute at
issue in Johnson v. Texas, 164 the legislature guaranteed that, hence-
forth, a sentencer would be able to consider a defendant's moral
culpability before imposing the ultimate penalty of death. 165
The Supreme Court, like the state legislatures, has recognized
that moral culpability plays a crucial role in the capital sentencing
procedure. In Penry v. Lynaugh, 166 the Court announced, on two
separate occasions, that "punishment should be directly related to
the personal culpability of the [criminal] defendant."' 167 Likewise,
the Court in Booth v. Maryland 168 concluded that capital sentencing
must be based on the "personal responsibility and moral guilt" of
the defendant. 169
As indicated by recent statements of state legislatures and the
161 OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150 (1991).
162 Id. § 163.150(1)(b)(D).
163 See supra note 66.
164 113 S. Ct. 2658 (1993).
165 See supra note 66.
166 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
167 Id. at 319, 327.
168 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
169 Id at 502. See also Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1986) (PowellJ.,
concurring) ("[A]s long as [statutes] do not foreclose consideration of factors that may
tend to reduce the defendant's culpability for his crime, this Court should respect
them.... [The] focus [should be] on evidence that lessens the defendant's culpability
for the crime for which he was convicted."); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 184
(1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("In my view, the principle underlying Lockett, Ed-
dings, and Hitchcock is that punishment should be directly related to the personal culpa-
bility of the criminal defendant.").
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Supreme Court, society clearly views moral culpability as an impor-
tant factor in the capital sentencing process. 170 Given this societal
consensus, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Texas sen-
tencing statute in force at the time Johnson was sentenced to death
violated the requirements of the Eighth Amendment.
B. WHILE APPLYING THE CONFLICTING PRINCIPLES OF FURMAN AND
LOCKET', THE MAJORITY LOST SIGHT OF THE IMPORTANCE OF
MORAL CULPABILITY IN THE CAPITAL SENTENCING PROCESS
The majority followed two well-established principles of Eighth
Amendment analysis. The first principle, established in Furman, re-
quires states to channel the discretion of sentencing juries through
appropriate statutory schemes. 171 The second principle, in tension
with the first, states that "[a] sentencer [must] ... not be precluded
from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that
the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death."'
172
Although the majority was correct in identifying these principles as
essential in assessing the constitutionality of the Texas capital sen-
tencing statute, the manner in which the Court applied them ig-
nored the most important aspect ofJohnson's mitigating evidence-
its relationship to his moral culpability.
The weakness in the majority's reasoning stems primarily from
its application of the second principle. In regard to this principle,
the majority stated that "there is no reasonable likelihood that the
jury would have found itself foreclosed from considering the rele-
vant aspects of [Johnson's] youth."' 173 The majority's conclusion
rested on the assumption that "[t]he relevance of youth as a mitigat-
ing factor derives from the fact that the signature qualities of youth
are transient."1 74 While youth certainly is transient, the majority
wrongly assumed that transience is the primary mitigating quality of
youth.
The majority essentially ignored the emotional and mental im-
maturity that frequently accompanies youth.' 75 The Court has re-
170 See supra notes 157-69 and accompanying text.
171 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
172 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
173 Johnson v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 2658, 2669 (1993). The majority determined that
"there is ample room in the assessment of future dangerousness for a juror to take ac-
count of the difficulties of youth as a mitigating force in the sentencing determination."
Id.
174 Id.
175 The majority did acknowledge that "[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped
sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are more under-
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peatedly recognized that "youth is more than a chronological fact.
It is a time and condition of life when a person may be most suscep-
tible to influence and to psychological damage."1 76 Deriving from
the adolescent's lack of the "experience, perspective, and judgment
expected of adults," this vulnerability frequently makes the adoles-
cent less morally culpable than an adult for the same criminal act. 1 7
The law must reflect this important aspect of youth by reducing the
level of punishment in relation to the degree to which the defend-
ant's immaturity influenced his criminal act.'7 8
While the majority correctly concluded that the special issues
framework did not preclude the jury from considering a relevant
mitigating aspect of youth-specifically the possibility that Johnson
would become less dangerous as he grew older-the majority failed
to recognize that the same special issues placed the most relevant
mitigating effect of youth beyond the jury's reach. Despite the jury's
inability to impose a sentence with a severity directly proportional to
the defendant's moral culpability, the majority upheld the Texas
statute.'7 9 According to the Court, the statute's failing did not rise
to the level of a constitutional violation because the jury could have
indirectly considered the effect ofJohnson's youth on his moral cul-
pability when answering the second special issue.' 80 It seems illogi-
cal, however, to say that the Eighth Amendment requires only an
standable among the young." ML at 2668-69. However, after making this statement, the
majority limited its significance by confining the jury's inquiry to the transient nature of
immaturity and impetuousness. ME at 2669. Thus, the majority gave no substantive sig-
nificance to Johnson's maturity level and its relationship with culpability, but rather re-
ferred to this aspect of youth merely as a tool to support the already obvious proposition
that youth is transient.
176 See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 815, 834 (1988); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979).
177 Eddings, 455 U.S. at 116; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835.
178 Eddings, 455 U.S. at 116 ("Crimes committed by youths may be just as harmful to
victims as those committed by older persons, but they deserve less punishment because
adolescents may have less capacity to control their conduct and to think in long-range
terms than adults.").
179 Constrained within the parameters of the inquiry of "future dangerousness," the
jury was unable to directly consider the effect of youth on Johnson's moral culpability.
Without directly considering that relationship, any final sentencing determination logi-
cally cannot be directly related to the amount of punishment that Johnson deserved.
Rather, the severity of the sentence will have a less precise, attenuated relationship with
moral culpability. As the Court has indicated, this is unacceptable. Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 302, 319, 327-28 (1989) ("[P]unishment should be directly related to the per-
sonal culpability of the [criminal] defendant.").
180 Johnson v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 2658, 2670 (1993). The majority stated that "[i]f any
jurors believed that the transient qualities of petitioner's youth made him less culpable
for the murder, there is no reasonable likelihood that those jurors would have deemed
themselves foreclosed from considering that in evaluating petitioner's future dangerous-
ness." Id
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indirect consideration of the element that society has deemed to be
most important to the capital sentencing determination.18 '
Although the jury may not have found Johnson's youth-he was
nineteen years of age at the time he committed the crime-to be a
significant mitigating factor in relation to Johnson's moral culpabil-
ity, the Constitution requires that the jury at least have the opportu-
nity to directly make such a determination.' 82 At some age, whether
it be sixteen years of age or fourteen years of age, the emotional and
mental immaturity associated with youth will have a pronounced
mitigating effect on a defendant's moral culpability.' 8 3 Because this
mitigating effect likely holds an inverse relationship to a defendant's
age, the flaw in the majority's reasoning would become even more
apparant if a defendant younger than Johnson were subject to
Texas' capital sentencing procedure. It would be interesting to see
whether the majority would have upheld the constitutionality of the
special issues if Johnson had been only fourteen years of age at the
time he committed the crime. At this younger age, the relationship
between youth and the defendant's "future dangerousness" be-
comes much more speculative, thus enhancing the danger that the
jury will not impose a sentence directly proportional to the four-
teen-year-old defendant's moral culpability.
In summary, in applying the competing principles announced
in Furman and Lockett to the facts ofJohnson's case, the majority did
not give sufficient weight to the evolving policy behind those princi-
ples. 184 As state legislation and prior Court opinions indicate, the
majority should have been guided by the current consensus that
moral culpability must play a central role in the death sentencing
analysis. Since the jury was not allowed to consider Johnson's
unique circumstances as they reflected upon his moral culpability,
his sentence should have been vacated by the Court. Although the
recent amendment of Texas' sentencing statute limits the immediate
impact of the Court's decision on future defendants, 85 the Court's
181 See supra part V.A.
182 See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
183 See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
184 See supra notes 156-69 and accompanying text. Since the scope of the Eighth
Amendment adapts to societal consensus, the principles underlying the Eighth Amend-
ment's protection must also fluctuate with societal consensus.
185 Any defendants who committed a capital murder in Texas after September 1, 1991
will be subject to the provisions of the amended sentencing statute. TEX. CRIM. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 37.071(2)(e) (West Supp. 1994). Because ajury has the ability under the
amended version of the statute to fully consider a defendant's proffered mitigating evi-
dence as it affects his moral culpability for the crime committed, the Court's principles
would not control the outcome of those defendants' appeals. Id. There may still be
convicted defendants on death row that are subject to the provisions of the Texas sen-
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reasoning may significantly influence the Texas legislature's percep-
tion of the capital sentencing process. By establishing precedent
counter to the prevailing societal consensus, the Court created a
temptation for the Texas legislature to abandon the recent amend-
ment of the capital sentencing statute. 1 86 Supported by the views of
the Court, the legislature may feel more confident about de-empha-
sizing the importance of moral culpability within a more stringent
capital sentencing statute.18
7
C. THE COURT SHOULD NOT SANCTION A SENTENCING STATUTE THAT
IS INCONSISTENT WITH SOCIETAL CONSENSUS WHEN PAST
PRECEDENT DOES NOT COMPEL THE COURT TO DO SO
Considered individually, none of the Texas special issues pro-
vided an effective medium for the jury to properly consider the rela-
tionship between Johnson's youth and his moral culpability for the
crime he committed. 188 Despite this deficiency, the majority felt
tencing statute under attack in Johnson v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 2658 (1993). For these
defendants, the Court's decision substantially diminishes the chance of succeeding on an
appeal based on ajury's inability to fully consider the defendant's unique circumstances
through the special issues inquiry.
186 Currently, there are three capital punishment-related bills pending in the Texas
legislature that may be indirectly affected by the Court's principles. See H.B. 2735, 73rd
Leg., Reg. Sess. (1993) (proposes to exclude defendants suffering from mental retarda-
tion or mental illness from the penalty of capital punishment); H.B. 727, 73rd Leg., Reg.
Sess. (1993) (proposes to make certain murders committed by individuals incarcerated
in penal institutions a capital offense punishable by death); H.B. 427, 73rd Leg., Reg.
Sess. (1993) (involves the punishment of attempted capital murder).
187 By reducing the risk of Eighth Amendment attack, the Court's decision created a
similar temptation for other states with pending capital punishment legislation to dimin-
ish the role of moral culpability within the capital sentencing process. See, e.g., Nebraska
L.B. 1351, 93rd Leg., 2d Sess. (1994) (changes provisions relating to sentencing and
appeals in capital punishment cases); Alaska H.B. 162, 18th Leg., 2d Sess. (1993) (au-
thorizes capital punishment and establishes sentencing procedures for capital felonies);
Massachusetts H.B. 677, 179th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (1994) (provides for capital pun-
ishment for certain persons convicted of first degree murder); Ohio S.B. 107, 120th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (1993) (establishes a new capital punishment aggravating circumstance
when murder is committed during the commission of a felonious assault by gross
abuse); Michigan S. J. Res. 6, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1993) (establishes capital punish-
ment for first degree murder); Mississippi H.B. 1479, 162nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (1994)
(allows trial judge to determine punishment in capital cases).
188 Johnson v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 2658, 2673 (1993) (O'Connor,J., dissenting). Part B
of this analysis indicated that the second special issue of "future dangerousness" was
inadequate for this purpose. The first and third special issues were equally ineffective.
For the first special issue, the jury determined that Johnson "deliberately" committed
the murder of the convenience store clerk. Id. at 2664. While at first glance it may
appear that a question dealing with Johnson's intent allowed the jury to address John-
son's moral culpability, the question was merely a restatement of the jury's determina-
tion in the conviction stage of the trial that Johnson intended to kill the store clerk.
Constrained by the redundant scope of the first special issue, there was no opportunity
for the jury to consider the relationship between Johnson's youth and his moral culpabil-
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compelled by former precedent, primarily through a reliance on
Jurek v. Texas,' 8 9 to reaffirm the constitutionality of the Texas capital
sentencing statute.' 90 This strong conviction to adhere to past pre-
cedent caused the majority actually to distort the Eighth Amend-
ment principles developed by the Court over the past decade.
As the Court recognized in Lockett v. Ohio,' 9 1 the Eighth Amend-
ment demands that sentencing statutes reflect the "respect due the
uniqueness of the individual."' 192 Following this policy, the Court
developed one of the most fundamental principles in Eighth
Amendment analysis: a sentencer must not be precluded from "giv-
ing independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant's char-
acter and record and to circumstances of the offense proferred in
mitigation."' 193 Although the majority purported to apply this prin-
ciple in evaluating the constitutionality of the Texas sentencing stat-
ute, it failed to give any significance to the most important term in
the principle-the word "independent."'' 94 Eliminating the word
"independent" from the stated principle, the majority concluded
that " 'Lockett and its progeny stand only for the proposition that a
State may not cut off in an absolute manner the presentation of miti-
gating evidence.' ,,195
The importance of the word "independent" stems from the
Court's desire to eliminate any statutory constraints that channel the
sentencer's attention away from the most relevant mitigating aspects
of an individual defendant and his crime.' 96 Under the Texas spe-
cial issue framework, any weight the jury gave to Johnson's youth
ity. Similarly, the third special issue did not provide a medium through which the jury
could give any weight to the all-important issue of Johnson's moral culpability because
the third special issue was not raised by the facts of Johnson. Id. at 2662 n.2.
189 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
190 Johnson, 113 S. Ct. at 2671-72.
191 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
192 Id. at 605.
193 Id. (emphasis added).
194 The majority simply stated that the principle of Lockett required "that the sen-
tencer... not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a de-
fendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." Johnson, 113 S. Ct. at 2665
(quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604). The majority completely ignored that the Court in
Lockett further defined the scope of the term "considering" to mean "giving independent
mitigating weight to aspects of [a] defendant's character." Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605 (em-
phasis added). In light of the Court's concern about not altering Lockett, it is ironic that
the majority actually did alter Lockett by eliminating the importance of the phrase "in-
dependent mitigating weight." See Johnson, 113 S. Ct. at 2671.
195 Johnson, 113 S. Ct. at 2666 (quoting McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 456
(1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
196 By giving "independent mitigating weight" to evidence, the sentencer can con-
sider any aspect of the evidence that may call for a less severe penalty. Thus, the sen-
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was entirely dependent on its relationship with the probability ofJohn-
son's "future dangerousness." This type of restricted consideration
of mitigating evidence created the very danger that the Court in
Lockett was trying to avoid. Without being able to give evidence "in-
dependent mitigating weight," it was unlikely that the jury would be
able to impose the appropriate level of punishment in relation to
Johnson's "unique" circumstances. 197 This unnecessary risk de-
prived Johnson of the full protection of the Eighth Amendment.
In addition to the majority's failure to recognize the importance
of the term "independent," the majority also relied too heavily on
Jurek v. Texas. 198 Although the Court in Lockett did not overrule
Jurek's conclusion that the Texas sentencing statute was constitu-
tional on its face, neither did the Court suggest that the statute
would always meet the requirements of the Eighth Amendment.
The Court explicitly stated at the time it decidedJurek, that the statute
allowed the sentencer in that case to consider any aspect of the de-
fendant's proferred evidence "as an independently mitigating fac-
tor."'199 Consistent with this determination, the Court in Penry v.
Lynaugh200 concluded that under certain fact patterns, the Texas
sentencing statute precluded the jury from giving independent miti-
gating weight to a defendant's proferred evidence.201 While Penry
also did not overruleJurek, the Court's decision opened the door to
future "as applied" constitutional attacks on the Texas statute.20 2
Because Johnson's argument closely followed the "as applied" prin-
ciples established in Penry, the majority should not have afforded
any weight to the conclusion in Jurek that the Texas statute was
facially constitutional.
In light of Penry, it is evident that the majority erred in conclud-
ing that the Eighth Amendment simply requires the sentencer to be
able to consider in some manner all of a defendant's relevant mitigat-
ing evidence. 203 According to the Court in Penry, a statute that does
tencer can consider and give effect to the critical relationship between Johnson's youth
and his moral culpability for the crime he committed.
197 See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605. Specifically, the jury was unable to impose a punish-
ment in proportion with Johnson's "unique" moral culpability for the crime he
committed.
198 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
199 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 607 ("None of the statutes we sustained in Gregg and the com-
panion cases lurek v. Texas] clearly operated at that time to prevent the sentencer from
considering any aspect of the defendant's character and record or any circumstances of
his offense as an independently mitigating factor.").
200 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
201 Id. at 320-22.
202 See id.
203 Johnson v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 2658, 2669 (1993) ("As long as the mitigating evi-
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not allow the jury to consider fully and give effect to the defendant's
mitigating evidence is clearly unconstitutional. 204 Without fully
considering the evidence, a sentencer would not be capable of mak-
ing a "reasoned moral response" about the appropriate level of
punishment to impose. 205 Only a system that allows the jury to
make a "reasoned moral response" to mitigating evidence will sat-
isfy the constitutional requirement that punishment "be directly re-
lated to the moral culpability of the defendant." 206 The majority's
attempt to differentiate Johnson's case from Penry did not focus on
this critical connection between the full consideration of evidence
and a "reasoned moral response." 20 7 Like Penry's evidence of
mental retardation, Johnson's youth had mitigating value that went
well beyond the special issue of "future dangerousness." The
proper inquiry under the Eighth Amendment should have been
whether the jury could fully consider Johnson's youth as it affected
his moral culpability. 208 Clearly, the special issues did not allow
the jury to make such a consideration and, thus, failed to ensure that
Johnson's punishment was "directly related" to his moral
culpability. 209
Just as the majority misapplied Penry, the majority improperly
invoked the doctrine of stare decisis by relying on Graham v. Col-
lins210 for precedential support. 211 Although the defendant in Gra-
ham claimed, similar to Johnson, that the Texas special issues did
dence is within 'the effective reach of the sentencer,' the requirements of the Eighth
Amendment are satisfied.") (quoting Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 901 (1993)).
204 In Penry, the Court stated on two separate occasions that a sentencing statute must
allow full consideration of mitigating evidence. First, while interpreting Franklin v.
Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164 (1988), the majority stated "both the concurrence and the dis-
sent [in Franklin] understood Jurek as resting fundamentally on the express assurance
that the special issues would permit the jury to fully consider all the mitigating evidence
a defendant introduced that was relevant to the defendant's background and character
and to the circumstances of the offense." Penry, 492 U.S. at 321 (emphasis added). Sec-
ond, the majority concluded that, "[r]ather than creating the risk of an unguided emo-
tional response,full consideration of evidence that mitigates against the death penalty is
essential." Id. at 328 (emphasis added).
205 Penry, 492 U.S. at 328.
206 Id. at 327.
207 Johnson, 113 S. Ct. at 2669-70. The Court stated that "the only logical manner in
which the evidence of [Penry's] mental retardation could be considered within the future
dangerousness inquiry was as an aggravating factor." Id. In contrast, the Court con-
cluded that "the ill effects of youth that [Johnson] may experience are subject to change
and, as a result, are readily comprehended as a mitigating factor in consideration of the
second special issue." Id. at 2670.
208 See supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
209 See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
210 113 S. Ct. 892 (1993).
211 Johnson, 113 S. Ct. at 2674.
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not allow the jury to give adequate mitigating effect to evidence of
his youth, 212 the Court's ruling against Graham213 should not have
affected the success of Johnson's claim. As Justice O'Connor indi-
cated in her dissenting opinion, the Court in Graham did not deal
directly with the issue of "whether an additional instruction to allow
the jury to give full effect to Graham's youth was constitutionally
mandated." 2 14 Because Graham was before the Court on a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus, the Court based its conclusion on the
threshold issue of whether the defendant's allegation would require
a new constitutional rule.
In contrast to Graham, Johnson brought his claim to the Court
on direct review.215 Although the majority recognized that it was
not necessary for the Court to determine whether Johnson was ask-
ing for a new constitutional rule, the majority still applied the analy-
sis of Graham to Johnson's case. 216 By using the reasoning of
Graham as precedent, the Court indirectly subjected Johnson to the
higher standards of collateral review.217 Given the severity of John-
son's sentence, the majority should have evaluated Johnson's argu-
ment solely on the basis of constitutional merit.218 The majority's
reliance on Graham, a case decided on a threshold issue irrelevant to
Johnson's claim, jeopardized this goal.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Johnson v. Texas, the Court concluded that the former Texas
capital sentencing statute did not violate the Eighth Amendment
rights of petitioner Dorsie Lee Johnson, Jr. Although the statute's
special issue framework may have prevented the jury from fully con-
212 Graham, 113 S. Ct. at 895.
213 Id. at 903.
214 Johnson, 113 S. Ct. at 2674 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor's state-
ment reflects the Court's conclusion in Graham that "even if Penry reasonably could be
read to suggest that Graham's mitigating evidence was not adequately considered under
the former Texas procedures, that is not the relevant inquiry under Teague." Graham, 113
S. Ct. at 902-03.
215 Johnson, 113 S. Ct. at 2668.
216 Id. at 2668-69.
217 Id. The principles established in Graham all revolved around the central issue of
whether Graham's requested relief was a new constitutional rule. The Court applied a
"reasonable jurists" standard to resolve this issue. Under this standard, the Court had
to rule against Graham "unless reasonable jurists hearing [his] claim at the time his
conviction became final 'would have felt compelled by existing precedent' to rule in his
favor." Graham, 113 S. Ct. at 898 (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990)).
When this standard is no longer relevant in a case on direct review, the conditional
relationship between Graham's principles and the standard breaks down, thus eroding
the precedential value of the principles.
218 Johnson, 113 S. Ct. at 2674 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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sidering the mitigating relationship between Johnson's youth and
his moral culpability for the crime committed, the Court determined
that the Eighth Amendment merely required the mitigating evi-
dence to be "within the effective reach of the sentencer."2 1 9 Be-
cause the jury could adequately consider the transient quality of
Johnson's youth in its determination of Johnson's "future danger-
ousness," the constitution did not require an additional jury instruc-
tion to inform the jury that it should directly consider the effect of
Johnson's youth on his moral culpability.
Similar to Penry v. Lynaugh,220 the Court should have ruled that
the Texas capital sentencing statute violated Johnson's Eighth
Amendment rights because the statute created a "risk that the death
penalty [would] be imposed in spite of factors which may [have]
call[ed] for a less severe penalty." 221 Clearly, youth has mitigating
relevance to a defendant's moral culpability for the crime commit-
ted. By forcing the jury to take account of this critical relationship
while answering the "future dangerousness" special issue, the stat-
ute confined the jury to an indirect consideration of the most rele-
vant mitigating aspect ofJohnson's youth-his moral culpability. As
a result of this deficiency, there was a grave danger that the Texas
system would impose a punishment that was not directly propor-
tional to Johnson's moral culpability. As in Penry, the Court should
have decided that a system which perpetuated this possibility was
"cruel and unusual punishment" under the Eighth Amendment.
J. MICHAEL BROWN
219 Id. at 2669.
220 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
221 Id. at 328 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978)).
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